

Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy (SSHAP)

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Friedrich Schiller University

Abstracts

(in alphabetical order)

Plenary Talks

Gottfried, Gabriel

(Wednesday, 2pm)

Frege and the Continental Roots of Analytic Philosophy

For a long time, analytic philosophy saw itself as having developed in opposition to continental philosophy. This one-sided historical interpretation can be traced back in particular to Michael Dummett's influential interpretation of Frege. Dummett declares Frege to be the father of analytic philosophy. For him analytic philosophy is philosophy following Frege. Although Dummett himself demands that analytic philosophy must understand its own history, he overlooks that Frege did not break with the continental tradition, but that his results are even rooted in it. The authors who are important for Frege are among others Johann Friedrich Herbart, Adolf Trendelenburg, Hermann Lotze, Christoph Sigwart and the Neo-Kantians Otto Liebmann and Wilhelm Windelband. The lecture will use selected examples to demonstrate Frege's continental background. The result will be that the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy needs to be reconsidered.

Tappenden, James

(Friday, 2pm)

Frege, Carl Snell, Kant and Romanticism: Reading Grundlagen § 88 in Context

Despite scholarly progress in recent decades, many aspects of the mysterious §88 of Frege's *Grundlagen* remain obscure. Not only is it unclear what some phrases and metaphors are intended to convey, but even when we do puzzle out what Frege meant, it can be hard to see how he could expect §88 to communicate it to his readers. This paper aims to decode §88 by reconstructing some tacit assumptions and references Frege would have expected his readers to recognise. (The paper takes its cue from Gottfried Gabriel's remark that, read in context, Frege's writings "teem with hidden references".) Among the things this paper will show: §88

would have been seen by Frege's readers as drawing on a recognised distinction between "the organic" and "the mechanical" arising from German Romantic *Naturphilosophie*; the "organic" side of the distinction was taken to be bound up with creative thought and "extending knowledge"; the metaphors Frege uses in this reply to Kant were known to be Kant's own metaphors. An important window into Frege's micro-environment in Jena is provided by the writings of Frege's "revered teacher" Carl Snell, not just in philosophy but also in mathematics and mathematics education.

van der Schaar, Maria

(Saturday, 2pm)

Frege on Judgement, Inference, and the Logocentric Predicament

As Sheffer formulates the logocentric predicament in 1926, 'in order to give an account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic'. When it comes to the most fundamental steps in our reasoning, when we apply *Modus Ponens*, logic can give no reason why *Modus Ponens* is valid. Frege was fully conscious of this problem: sometimes, he writes that the logician has nothing further to say; at other moments, he does give an account of the validity of *Modus Ponens*, although this account is to be understood in first-personal terms. On the basis of one's logical capacity alone, one is able to understand why *Modus Ponens* is valid. How are we to understand the logical capacity, the logical source of knowledge? If the normativity of a Begriffsschrift is founded on the exercises of our logical capacity, how does this relate to Frege's thesis that logic is to give the laws of truth?

Session Talks

Antonutti, Marianna

(Frege in Comparison, Thursday, 9am)

Frege and Hilbert on mathematical method and proof

The disagreement between Frege and Hilbert is chiefly concerned with the nature of axioms. This disagreement has deep epistemological and semantic consequences for their views of logic and mathematics, including their respective conceptions of consistency and independence proofs, and more generally the proper method of mathematics (axiomatic vs. genetic). In this talk, I will argue that despite their disagreement on the nature of axioms, their positions concerning mathematical method and proof are close in some important respects. This consideration is motivated by the importance that the notion of a rigorous proof plays in both Frege's and Hilbert's work. Both viewed ideally rigorous proofs as formal, gapless arguments in which all the premises and inference steps are made explicit, in order to prevent implicit reliance on intuition at any point in the proof. Although Frege and Hilbert differed on whether the validity of a proof depends on the meanings of the constituent statements, both viewed the notion of rigorous proof as a guarantee of correctness, rather than the source of mathematical justification.

Arbeiter, Sophia

(*Tractatus* and Logic, Saturday, 9:45am)

Logical Sentences in the Tractatus

In §6.124 of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein provides an especially puzzling characterization of the logical sentences:

Logical sentences describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather, they represent it. They ‘concern’ nothing. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary sentences have sense: and this is their connection with the world.

This characterization is partially negative: in contrast to significant sentences, logical sentences do not concern anything, i.e. they do not represent possible situations. Yet, Wittgenstein’s characterization in §6.124 is also partially positive: the logical sentences are characterized as describing [beschreiben], then precisified as representing [darstellen], the scaffolding of the world. My aim is to make sense of such positive characterizations of the logical sentences.

First, I explain the significance of the difference between the claim “*the tautology ‘ $p \vee \sim p$ ’ shows*” and the claim “*that ‘ $p \vee \sim p$ ’ is a tautology shows.*” Wittgenstein makes the latter claim, such as in §6.122. I argue that Wittgenstein characterizes the logical sentences in completely different terms to the significant sentences. Significant sentences are characterized in virtue of what they *do*: they say something, they represent something, they are logical pictures. Logical sentences, in contrast, do not do anything at all—neither do they show, nor do they say anything. Here, I disagree with Kremer (2002).

Second, I discuss §5.143, which claims that logical sentences are what “all sentences have in common.” What could this mean? I argue that we must recognize that only the tautologies are the logical sentences, as claimed in §6.1. Here, I disagree with Conant (1991), who thinks that the logical sentences include both tautologies and contradictions. In addition to §5.143, I build on §4.465 to make my case. By appreciating these disanalogies, I hope to offer a reading of Wittgenstein’s puzzling conception of the logical sentences with the aim of making some progress in understanding why he speaks of logical truth *at all*.

Beaney, Michael

(Frege on Functions, Wednesday, 3:45pm)

Frege’s first step

In this talk I identify the key first step in Frege’s philosophy, from which all else follows, both his invention and use of quantificational logic in seeking to show how arithmetic can be reduced to logic as well as the paradoxes and problems that arose, about which philosophers have argued ever since. The idea of a ‘first step’ is taken from Wittgenstein, and I also elucidate the analytic significance of this idea in understanding the creativity of philosophy and in diagnosing philosophical confusion.

Benoist, Jocelyn

(Frege and Language, Saturday, 11am)

Frege and the grammar of representation

The notion of sense (*Sinn*) introduced by Frege as an intermediate entity between the sign and the referent, when there is one, may give rise to a number of legitimate doubts. These questions should not lead us to ignore the basic significance of the distinction between sense and representation (*Vorstellung*). Sense is an operator of de-psychologization. By transferring to sense some of the functions -the logical functions- that tradition had attributed to representation, Frege sought to assert the fundamental independence of these functions from subjectivity. On the one hand, we might think that the notion of representation inherited from modern thought is thus extenuated, reduced to a merely psychological use; on the other, we might suspect that it continues in another way, sublimated so to speak, precisely under the guise of this semantic ideality called “sense”. The second reading could feed a criticism of Fregean semantic objectivism, which would see it as an ethereal psychologism: a transcendental psychologism, as it were. Such an accusation is only possible, however, if we maintain, at this level too, the constitutive ambiguity of the notion of representation, between occurrence and ideality. Now, Frege's analysis precisely addresses this ambiguity. Rather than simply criticizing the alleged powers of a “representation” whose notion we might take for granted, Frege elucidates its grammar in a resolute way, highlighting under this heading two very different uses and two very different problems.

Berg, Alexander

(E.E.C. Jones and her influence, Friday, 5:15pm)

Wittgenstein Introduces Frege to Soviet Russia: Possibility, Probability, and the Curious Case of the Yellow Book

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Berkovski, Sandy

(Varia, Wednesday, 5:15pm)

Three conceptions of common sense

I compare Moore's approach to common sense with the lesser known views by Peirce and Mach. Though my discussion will be largely historical and expository, I will also offer a systematic diagnosis, that only Mach's approach is epistemologically promising, both in explaining the links between common sense and science, and as a response to a radical sceptic.

Besler, Gabriela, Dolf Rami, Monja Reinhart, and Niko Strobach

(Panel, Saturday, 9am, 9:45am, 11am, 11:45am)

Heinrich Scholz and the History of Frege-Edition

This panel provides an overview of Heinrich Scholz's work and his group with special focus on the philosophical motivation for editing Frege's works. The political implications of the edition project will be discussed, as well as Scholz's philosophy of mathematics, which formed the basis for his interest in Frege. Moreover, we are going to present some new results of historical investigations with respect to the Frege collection stored in the Münster University

Library. Finally, the panel will move from historical investigations to recent work on editing Frege.

Boccuni Francesca

(Frege on Functions, Wednesday, 4:30pm)

Frege Arithmetic and Finitude

In this talk, I will investigate the proof-theoretic strength, as intended by Heck, of consistent fragments of Frege's infamous BLV, and show that some such fragments are proof-theoretically stronger than Hume's Principle (HP). This result will shed light on the debate between Heck and Neologicists concerning finite Frege Arithmetic as the theory best suited to recover ordinary arithmetic.

Bogucki, Krystian

(Frege on Vagueness and Determinacy, Wednesday, 3:45pm)

Frege on Vagueness

The paper discusses Frege's view of vagueness. Frege's sharpness requirement (vague predicates have no *Bedeutung*) seems to lead (together with some other principles) to nihilism. According to nihilism, most sentences of ordinary language lack truth values because they contain vague expressions that have no *Bedeutung* (Dummett 1975, Kemp 1996, van Heijenoort 1986). Puryear (2012) and Ruffino (2003) have proposed to reject nihilism by claiming that Frege does not believe in the sharpness requirement. In my paper, I defend the epistemic reading offered by Burge (1990). I argue that Puryear's and Ruffino's criticisms of Burge miss some important distinctions.

Bones, Inga

(E.E.C. Jones and her influence, Friday, 4:30pm)

"Why, this Logic is nothing but Common Sense!" – E.E.C. Jones on Ordinary Language and Common Sense

Recent years have seen a budding interest in the work of Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones (1848–1922), a British philosopher on the cusp of early analytic philosophy. Most publications about Jones, however, focus on her contributions to logic and the philosophy of language. Jones' methodological remarks, interspersed throughout her writings, have yet been underappreciated. I argue that a careful examination of these remarks paints a picture of a philosopher who, in her consideration of ordinary language and her emphasis on common sense, was well ahead of her time.

Bracke, Stef

(Russell, Saturday, 3:45pm)

More than Russell's Dummy: Couturat's Logicism in the Manuel de Logistique

Couturat is often considered to be the mere mouthpiece of Russell. In this paper, I aim to reinstate Couturat as an original logicist philosopher by arguing that this standard construal is based on a superficial reading of his *Les Principes des Mathématiques*. While it is true that *Principes* is a genuine attempt to express Russell's ideas, this is not its only purpose. The *Principes* was also written as a preliminary to Couturat's *Manuel de Logistique*, in which he defends an original version of logicism that integrates both the algebra of logic tradition and Russell's logicism.

Brauer, Ethan

(History of Logic, Friday, 4:30pm)

Poincare on Induction, Intuition, and the Other Objection to Logicism

In a series of exchanges with Russell, Couturat, and others, Poincare raised several objections against logicism and argued that intuition was required for the justification of mathematical induction. Poincare's most famous objections charge the logicist with some form of circularity, claiming that the logicist's theories either presuppose a knowledge of arithmetic or require an appeal to induction to justify the theory. But Poincare raised another objection which has received much less attention. He argued that, absent an appeal to intuition, the logicist was bound to commit a fallacy of equivocation between how they defined numbers and then how they actually used numbers in their reasoning. In this paper, I highlight Poincare's equivocation objection and explain some of the advantages it has over his other objections to logicism. I also suggest that understanding this objection can shed light on Poincare's notion of intuition.

Büchi, Romain

(Ramsey, Thursday, 4:30pm)

Ramsey's Contribution to the Entscheidungsproblem

Frank P. Ramsey's 1928 paper "On a Problem of Formal Logic" proves the decidability of the Bernays-Schönfinkel class with added identity. His goal and approach represent a remarkable junction in the history of modern logic, influenced by the *Principia Mathematica*, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, and Hilbert's metamathematical program. While the first part of his paper had a well-known afterlife in combinatorics, the philosophical significance of its second part has been largely overlooked. This talk aims to contribute to its philosophical evaluation, particularly in relation to Ramsey's critical discussion of Wittgenstein's way of handling identity.

Chen, Bo

(Varia, Saturday, 9:45am)

Benacerraf's Problem and the accessibility of "The Third Realm"

In his article "Mathematical Truth" (1973), Paul Benacerraf puts forward the later well-known "Benacerraf's problem" about mathematics: if mathematical objects, as supposed by Platonists, are abstract objects which has nothing to do with our sensual experience, how do we access to mathematical truths? As well known, Frege develops a platonic theory about thought (the third realm) which includes ten theses: A thought is the sense of an assertoric sentence or of a propositional question; Thoughts have truth-values, and they are true forever once they are

true; Thoughts are structured: argument-function structure and compound structures; Thoughts do not belong to the external world, because they are immaterial and imperceptible; Thoughts do not belong to the inner world, because they are shareable by different people; Thoughts belong to the third realm, because they are mind-independent, non-spatial, non-temporal, causally inert, eternal entities; Thoughts can be apprehended and grasped by people; There are at least two criteria for sameness of thought; Thoughts have some effects on the inner worlds of people, encroach on the sphere of the will, and then produce changes in the external world; The objectivity and generality of thoughts guarantees the objectivity and generality of logic. However, Frege's theory of thoughts have to face the "Access problem" similar with Benacerraf's problem about mathematical truths: how do we grasp a thought? How do we determine whether a thought is true or false? How can we identify the sameness of thoughts? How can we make clear the complicate relations among the objects of the third realm? Although Frege presents sort of replies to these questions, but his replies are too sketchy, obscure, suggestive and evasive to be rationally understood and accepted. I strongly agree to Dummett's evaluation '**the myth of the third realm.**' I argue that it is the source of all the troubles with the third realm that Frege lacks an intermediate category like inter-subjectivity to bridge from pure objectivity to pure subjectivity. I try to develop an alternative theory of thought resulting from the revision of Frege's.

Cristalli, Claudia, Sander Verhaegh, Nina Ijzens, and Gregor Bös

(Panel, Thursday, 9am, 9:45am, 11am, 11:45pm)

Exiled Empiricists: American Philosophy and the Intellectual Migration

In the 1930s, hundreds of academics fled to the United States to escape the political situation in Europe. Among them were dozens of philosophers from a variety of schools: logical empiricism, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology. The first group would have a tremendous impact on U.S. philosophy. Whereas the local intellectual climate had been shaped by American schools like pragmatism and idealism, the exiled empiricists contributed to the growth of an analytic conception of philosophy that has dominated the field ever since. How could a small group of refugee philosophers have such an impact on American philosophy? And how did logical empiricism itself change in the wake of the migration? This symposium presents four papers from the ERC project "Exiled Empiricists", all starting from the assumption that the key to these questions lies in a better understanding of the American academic and socio-political climate that proved so susceptible to the migrants' ideas.

De Benedetto, Matteo

(The Vienna Circle, Friday, 5:15pm)

Carnap's mid-methodology: the "translation to the formal mode of speech"

In this talk I will argue that we ought to refine the traditional two-step picture of Carnap's methodological development by recognizing a third mid-methodology between Carnap's early efforts of rational reconstruction and his late projects of explication. More specifically, I will show how Carnap's efforts in the Syntax in offering a "translation to the formal mode of speech" of philosophical statements can be considered as an instance of a general translational methodology according to which Carnap organizes his philosophical activity in the

middle part of his life. Analyzing several methodologically revealing passages of the Syntax, I will demonstrate that a distinctive feature of this translational methodology is the specific kind of linguistic pluralism that this method allows, i.e., a conceptually broad but methodologically narrow pluralism.

De Pellegrin, Enzo

(Frege, Saturday, 3:45pm)

Limits of Criticism: Wittgenstein on Frege in his Blue Book

In his *Blue Book*, Ludwig Wittgenstein briefly discusses a charge mounted by Frege against formalist mathematicians in the *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. The passage is sometimes interpreted as expressing a criticism of Frege broad enough to encompass both Frege's notion of sense and his conception of meaning. My paper examines several exegetical problems that this interpretation faces and offers an alternative reading of the passage, drawing on a wide array of textual evidence and making use of recent research on the composition and structure of the *Blue Book*.

Descarreaux, Samuel, and Francesco Pisano

(Panel, Saturday, 9am, 9:45am)

Kantian Sources of "Mathematical Logic" in the second half of the 19th century?

This symposium offers a systematic reassessment of the often-overlooked German reception of British sources of the "New Logic," "Symbolical Logic," or more broadly, "Mathematical Logic," within the post- and neo-Kantian tradition of the late 19th century. The works of authors such as C. von Sigwart and F.-A. Lange, who debated if logic was an art or a science of reasoning, providing normative rules for correct inference, remain marginal and fragmentary. These works are critically examined in the context of their historical and philosophical significance.

Dizadji-Bahmani, Foad

(Wittgenstein and others, Saturday, 4:30pm)

Forms of life and Wittgenstein's remark on Frazer's The Golden Bough

Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's *The Golden Bough* is often seen as relatively marginal in his corpus. However, Wittgenstein's remarks here can be seen as a concentrated expression of his broader later philosophical method and his conception of meaning. In particular, the present paper re-examines Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer in order to glean insight into Wittgenstein's notion of a *form of life*. Against Frazer's causal interpretations of ritualistic (magical) practices as primitive pseudo-science, Wittgenstein proposes that such practices are to be understood as *expressive*. That is, such acts are to be understood as gestures imbued with meaning through the practices into which they are embedded; as expressions internal to a particular form of life. This notion of form of life might be understood as sanctioning a kind of relativism: there are, or were, different societies and we can only hypothesize about the meaning of *their* practices. This is how it is often read based on the *Philosophical Investigations*. But attending to Remarks on Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, two aspects of *form of life* are made salient, or so I will argue. First, any *explanatory* account of a form of life is not final for, as Wittgenstein puts it,

ultimately '[w]e can only *describe* and say, human life is like that'. (p.3e) Second, that such hypothesization is possible at all intimates that there is, and perhaps must be, a commensurability between such different forms of life.

Døhl, Ane Maria Gerdes

(Varia, Wednesday, 4:30pm)

Why international languages are philosophically important

Several early logicians were interested in international auxiliary languages, although their work has been dismissed as subordinate to their more serious philosophical endeavours. I argue that this dismissal of international languages as philosophically uninteresting has been unfair. There is a close connection between mathematical logic and the projects of a universal language, one that can best be understood by retracing the common Leibnizian ancestor. Peano's pasigraphy, his work on *Latine sine flexione*, and Frege's *Begriffsschrift*, were all partial realisations of Leibniz's grand dream of a universal characteristic, and are best understood as connected projects.

Dudley, Sean

(Frege on Functions, Saturday, 3:45pm)

Function and Object from Kant to Frege: The Begriffsschrift in the tradition of the 19th c. Reform of Logic

This paper argues that the philosophical principles underlying Frege's *Begriffsschrift* (1879) reflect a broader continuity with the 19th-century German "Reform of Logic"—an intellectual movement aimed at reshaping logic into a proper canon and criterion for the sciences, inspired by a depsychologized reading of Kant. Rather than marking a sharp break, Frege's revolution in logic is shown to develop thematically and causally out of this reform tradition. Among the formative influences shaping this context are Herbart, Trendelenburg, Lotze, and Sigwart, whose work contributed to the broader reconceptualization of logic that set the stage for Frege's own project.

Ebbs, Gary

(Frege and others, Saturday, 4:30pm)

Explication as Philosophical Paradigm

Inspired by theoretical advances in logic, mathematics, and the natural science, inquirers in the tradition of scientific philosophy—Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Goodman, Hilary Putnam, among many others—aim to apply similar methods to clarify or dissolve philosophical questions. In philosophy, just as in science, they reason, one can do no better than to work from within, relying on already established beliefs and inferences and applying our best methods for reevaluating them and arriving at new ones. For these philosophers a paradigmatic task of philosophy is to apply the *method of explication*, whereby a term we find useful in some ways, but problematic in others, is replaced by another term that serves the useful purposes of the old term and is more theoretically fruitful than the old term but does not have its problems. It is not easy to discern, however, what the method is and how to distinguish it from its proponents' decisions about which terms to explicate and how to

explicate them. As a first step toward addressing this difficulty, I shall argue that despite their many differences, Carnap and Quine endorse the same method of explication, according to which, among other things, (1) a linguistic expression *e'* explicates an expression *e* only if (a) the criteria for applying *e'* are independent of the criteria for applying *e*, and (b) the criteria for applying *e'* enable one to explain the point and significance of *e'* without relying on the criteria for applying *e*; (2) in the formulation of any theory, there are some terms, such as those that express negation or universal quantification, that are so basic to the theory that they cannot be explicated by other terms of the theory but can only be *elucidated* by remarks and illustrative examples that are aimed at helping a person learn to use them; and (3) in some cases our introduction of a term *e'* that satisfies (a) and (b) of point (1) also has the effect of elucidating the old term *e* for us, by showing us how to subtract from our pre-explicational uses of *e* what we later come to regard as confused or mistaken assumptions about how to apply *e*.

Eisenthal, Joshua

(Tractatus, Saturday, 11:45am)

Names and Objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

Understanding the nature of Tractarian names and Tractarian objects has been a persistently fraught area of Wittgenstein scholarship, particularly as Wittgenstein didn't seem to provide any examples of either. In this talk, I flesh out an interpretation of names and objects that is explored in Wittgenstein's wartime *Notebooks*, especially in his entries in May and June of 1915. There, Wittgenstein considers how terms in colloquial sentences often function as simple names, while ordinary items of reference are often treated as simple objects. I consider how, surprisingly, a version of this account may in fact be present in the *Tractatus*.

Engelbarth, David

(Varia, Thursday, 4:30pm)

Brentano's Ontology of Relations

In my talk I want to discuss Franz Brentano's theory of relations. It is part of the philosophical enterprise which he calls *Kategorienlehre* and which is key for his late ontological thought. But Brentano's late "ontology of relations" has not found much attention in scholarship so far, although it can help to gain a better understanding of the "intentional relation" which he famously rediscovered. By setting Brentano's account of relations in contrast to Bertrand Russell's I want to show that he can offer us, without doubt, a noteworthy alternative.

Engelmann, Mauro

(Varia, Thursday, 3:45pm)

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Remarks (1930): Immediate Experience has no Owner

In "Philosophical Remarks" (1930), like most philosophers at the time (Russell, Carnap, and Moore, for instance), Wittgenstein accepted that immediate experience is the ground for the truth of propositions. However, differently from his contemporaries, he argued that this assumption does not assume or imply the ownership and privacy of immediate experience. This view is defended in three argumentative moves. First, by showing that 'I', 'you', 'L.W.' are not

essential (names) in statements about personal experience. Second, by arguing that immediate experience is not composed of things or kinds of objects. Third, given the first and second arguments, the talk about the ownership of personal/immediate experience is not meaningful (the point is exemplified with 'pain'). I argue then that the elucidation of these points, and the elimination of confusion surrounding them, inform a new, system-like understanding of immediate experience that indeed allows it to be the neutral/impartial ground for the truth of propositions that philosophers wished for.

Fan, Zhao, and Hidenori Kurokawa

(Wittgenstein and others, Saturday, 5:15pm)

Behind the Scenes: Wittgenstein's Diagonal Argument and Kreisel

In the literature, attempts of making sense of Wittgenstein's 1947 variant of the diagonal argument (RPP I §1097), called "Wittgenstein's diagonal argument" by Floyd, focused mostly on its connection to Turing's 1936 proof of undecidability (e.g., Floyd 2012; Kanamori 2020; Mühlhölzer 2020). However, appealing to the Turing connection cannot fully address the historical context, the structure, and the logical and philosophical significance of Wittgenstein's diagonal argument. In this talk, we will propose a fresh interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument by scrutinizing the works of Kreisel, with whom Wittgenstein spent considerable time discussing the philosophy of mathematics in the 1940s.

Felappi, Giulia

(Language in Analytic Philosophy, Friday, 9am)

Frege, 'That'-clauses and misleading character of Truth Talk

According to Kremer, Frege's aim, in the opening of *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*, is 'not to refute the [*Begriffsschrift*] account but to show that it has been misconceived. What we need to do is to view ' $a = b$ ' not as specifying a relation between mere figures, but between signs, individuated 'as signs' (2010, p.256). I will show that there are reasons to call into question Kremer's stance. I will show that if we were to take identity claims as specifying a relation between signs *individuated 'as signs'*, claims incompatible with the rest of *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* would follow.

Friedman, Michael

(Metaphors in Analytic Philosophy, Thursday, 11:45am)

On Metaphors and Mathematics: Hans Blumenberg reading Wittgenstein's and Husserl's Writings on Mathematics

Hans Blumenberg's thought and the philosophy of mathematics are generally not associated with one another. Indeed, Blumenberg (1920-1996) is known for his work in the field of the history and philosophy of ideas, which focuses on the role played by metaphors in the formation of concepts and of images of knowledge. However, in his various works he also discusses Wittgenstein's and Husserl's writings on mathematics, discussing as well the associated metaphors. The talk hence aims to analyze Blumenberg as a reader of Wittgenstein and of Husserl, examining how Blumenberg himself considered philosophy of mathematics and of mathematical practices.

Glock, Hanjo

(Varia, Wednesday, 5:15pm)

Frege's three-world-ontology and Strawson's 'liberal naturalism'

There are important similarities between my two protagonists, notably concerning the possibility of truth-value gaps and treating propositions rather than sentences as the primary bearers of truth-values. There are also contrasts, concerning their respective attitudes towards the scope and limitations of formal symbolisms and the relation between logic and language. The main part of my presentation deals with a completely unexplored connection between the two. While Frege is widely and rightly regarded as a Platonist and anti-naturalist, Strawson's later work propagates a 'liberal naturalism'. On closer scrutiny, however, the two positions are closer than might at first appear. On the one hand, Frege's Platonism is partly motivated by epistemic and semantic considerations. On the other hand, Strawson's naturalism amounts to an anti-revisionism that acknowledges and defends the commitment of established discourse to non-physical phenomena such as properties, propositions, and rules. What is more, a version of Frege's three-world-ontology can be combined with a Strawsonian 'relaxed realism'. On the one hand, Strawson's argument for properties by appeal to non-nominal quantification into predicate position, suitably modified, helps to demystify Platonism. On the other hand, Frege's distinction between objectivity and actuality can be used to shore up Strawson's resistance to 'hard naturalism'. But this requires an additional step that neither Frege nor Strawson take, namely abandoning the venerable prejudice according to which only ultimate efficient causes are genuinely real.

Glover, James

(Varia, Wednesday, 3:45am)

Revisiting Frank Ramsey's Philosophy of Science

In this paper, I reject the realist and pragmatist interpretations of Frank Ramsey's philosophy of science (Sahlin 1990; Majer 1989; 1991; Psillos [2006] 2009; Misak 2016). I argue, against all these views, that Ramsey's approach to theories was straightforwardly anti-realist. I show that Psillos and Misak misconstrue Ramsey's arguments, and obscure Ramsey's emphatic rejection of scientific realism. And while older pragmatist interpretations correctly identify the influence of Weyl and Hilbert on Ramsey's view, they confuse Ramsey's endorsement of methodological pragmatism for an endorsement of pragmatist metaphysics and semantics. I argue that the Weyl-Hilbert analysis structurally precludes pragmatist metaphysics or semantics.

Goldfarb, Warren

(History of Logic, Friday, 11am)

The Early Axiomatic Systems for Sentential Logic

Frege's axiom system for sentential logic in the *Begriffsschrift* had a redundant axiom, although this was not discerned until 50 years later. I give a very simple proof of the redundancy, and suggest why Frege did not see it. In the *Grundgesetze*, Frege formulated a different system, with fewer axioms and more inference rules. The equivalence of the two systems is not hard to prove, but Frege made no attempt to do so. Russell's first axiomatic system of sentential

logic came in 1906, and is much less elegant than Frege's, although he wrote "the ideas are ... those of Frege's". I speculate that he devised his system in order to provide quicker derivations of the laws of disjunction and conjunction, and so put it in closer alignment with the algebra of logic, particularly the postulate systems of E. V. Huntington.

Gombin, Jonathan

(Varia, Saturday, 11:00am)

Is There Such a Thing as Tractarian Aesthetics?

The word "aesthetics" occurs only once in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* and the only thing that Wittgenstein has to say about it is that it is "one and the same" with ethics (6.421). This has led interpreters to either entirely neglect tractarian aesthetics, assuming that there is no such thing, or, on the contrary, to simply apply to aesthetics what the *Tractatus* has to say about ethics. Both approaches are misguided: there is indeed such a thing as tractarian aesthetics, but it is to be found in Wittgenstein's insistence on what is being grasped through *feelings* (in 4.1213, 5.4541, 6.1232, 6.45, etc.) rather than in his sole considerations on ethics.

Green, Karen

(Quine and Frege, Friday, 11am)

Quine versus Frege on Quantification

Quine has been a critic of second-order logic and has advocated restricting quantification to first-order variables. Second-order variables are taken to range over concepts, properties, relations, or functions and Quine deems these to be 'abstract entities' of dubious scientific value. He claims that advocates of second order quantification are confused and/or profligate. These objections to second-order quantification are argued to be ineffective against Frege's quantification into predicate position. The paper falls into two parts. In the first Frege is defended against the charge of being a confused logician. In the second, he is defended against being a profligate logician.

Greimann, Dirk

(Frege on Truth and Judgement, Thursday, 11:45am)

The Foundations of Frege's Conception of Truth

It is widely assumed that Frege's conception of truth is based either on his analysis of the word 'true' or on his theory of sense and reference. According to the first approach, we must ascribe to Frege a radically deflationist conception of truth. According to the second, his conception must be regarded as a realist conception that is similar to Tarski's semantic conception of truth. The aim of my talk is to show that Frege's conception has a deeper foundation. It is ultimately based on the pragmatic assumption of his theory of assertion that asserting is the act of "presenting" something "as a true" or "as a fact". According to this approach, the word "true" is redundant only because sentences of the form "It is true that p" express the truth of their propositional contents twice: firstly, in virtue of their "assertoric form", which Frege represents in his formal language by the assertion sign "[]", and secondly, by means of the predicate "true". We must distinguish between the propositional act of predicating truth and the illocutionary act

of asserting something as true. The latter is not redundant. According to his first system, the assertion sign in “|— p” expresses that the circumstance p “is a fact”. This is an “ontic” notion of truth, and not a “semantic” one (cf. K. Green 2024). It means to be “the case” or to “obtain” or “to be a fact”. Frege’s second system, which is characterized by the distinction between sense and reference, contains both an ontic and a semantic notion of truth. The ontic notion operates at the level of reference. It is represented by the assertion sign, again. In “|— White(snow)”, for instance, the assertion sign expresses that the truth value denoted by “— White(snow)” is “the True”, i.e., it expresses that snow really falls under the concept *white*. The semantic notion of truth, on the other hand, operates at the level of sense. According to it, a true thought is a mode of presentation that refers to a special object, the True. For Frege, this is a derivative notion of truth. To explain it, we need the ontic notion. Thus, the thought expressed by “Snow is white” refers to (*bedeutet*) the True if and only if it is really the case that snow is white. The ontic notion of truth, by contrast, is considered by Frege as a *notion sui generis* that cannot be reduced to any more fundamental concepts.

Gustafsson, Martin

(Quine and Frege, Friday, 11:45am)

Are Fregean definitions Quinean explications

In this paper, I will identify two different ways of inheriting Frege. One is a broadly Quinean way, which sees Frege’s logicist project as an exercise in Quinean explication. The other is a broadly Wittgensteinian way, which emphasizes Frege’s conception of logical distinctions as distinctions that are radically different from mere differences in properties. My claim is not going to be that one mode of inheritance is exegetically sounder than the other. Rather, my general view is that the possibility of both modes of inheritance is indicative of certain important tensions in Frege’s work. I will focus on one central moment in Frege’s thought, namely the notorious so-called Julius Caesar problem as it is discussed in *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*. Frege’s way of dealing with this problem – and indeed, his sense that it constitutes a genuine problem at all – certainly encourages the Quinean branch of inheritance. The Wittgensteinians, by contrast, might here see a moment at which Frege’s better ideas should be turned against himself. Importantly, however, I will argue that such a Wittgensteinian reaction need not involve a complete rejection of Frege’s notion that definitions can be fruitful.

Hegarty, Michael

(Varia, Thursday, 3:45pm)

Sellars, Reid, and ‘Direct’ Perception

Perception is typically called ‘indirect’ when ordinary objects are not its immediate objects. To explain how perception connects us to the world, some theories invoke more primitive relations of acquaintance; others appeal to inference. Representational theories of perception — such as Wilfrid Sellars’ ‘Dual-Component Intentionalism’ (DCI) — are often marketed as forms of *direct* realism. For Sellars, perceptual episodes are inner, representational states — a view echoed in much contemporary cognitive science. But how do such inner episodes secure *direct* perceptual contact with the world? Cognitive scientists frequently appeal to subpersonal inference to explain this relation. Contemporary philosophers sympathetic to this view may say that we perceive *through* some representational inner state. But what does it mean to perceive *through* such a state? One might look to the subpersonal information processing that gives rise

to person-level perceptual episodes — but here, again, inference looms large. Alternatively, one might posit a *sui generis* relation that allows perceptual contact via representational states. Yet this strategy risks replicating the very problems that plagued sense-datum theories. So we face a puzzle: how can representational accounts underwrite direct perception? I approach this puzzle by reconsidering the historical roots of Sellars' DCI in Thomas Reid's direct realism. Reid is no representationalist, yet there is an underexplored connection — arguably shared by both Reid and Sellars but rejected by many contemporary views — namely, the idea that perception essentially involves *belief*. I explore whether this neglected element might shed new light on the prospects for a genuinely direct representational theory of perception.

Held, Jonas

(Frege & Wittgenstein on Force and Content, Friday, 11am)

Wittgenstein and Frege on the Content of an Assertion

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein criticizes "Frege's opinion that every assertion contains an assumption" (*PI*, §22). Wittgenstein's criticism is directed against the view that the act of asserting that *p* presupposes a logically primary act of merely entertaining the content "that *p*". A mere *that*-clause like "that it is raining", Wittgenstein argues, "is *not* a sentence in our language – it is not yet a *move* in the language-game." In my talk, I will outline this criticism in some detail. But the main part of my talk will be devoted to the question of how Wittgenstein himself understands the relation between assumption and assertion. For it is of course possible to merely assume something without asserting it at the same time. And it is also true that assertion and assumption have the same content. Because it is precisely the question of how the content of an assertion is to be understood that is at issue. I will show that an answer to this question can be found in the course of Wittgenstein's reflections on Moore's paradox.

Hicks, Michael

(Frege, Saturday, 4:30pm)

The distinction between Concept and Object: on Sellars's misinterpretation of Frege

Wilfrid Sellars maintained that the distinction between concept and object was of "decisive importance in the history of ontology." But Sellars also misunderstood that distinction: writing in the early 1960s, he was unaware that Fregean concepts were not supposed to be the senses of concept words, but their *Bedeutungen*. Drawing on this misinterpretation, I explain the significance Sellars attached to the distinction, and why, from his perspective, correcting the interpretation would wreck the neo-Fregean account he was developing. I conclude, however, by arguing that some of Sellars's deepest commitments can be better appreciated if we correct his reading of Frege.

Hunter, David

(Frege, Saturday, 5:15pm)

Frege on 'securing oneself an environment'

In a puzzling passage, Frege says that in the “step through which we secure ourselves an environment we expose ourselves to the risk of error.” This is puzzling because we are all born into an environment, even before we have our first thought. So what can Frege mean by ‘*securing*’ an environment? And what sort of ‘step’ does he have in mind? How could having an environment be an achievement? Thinking about these questions can help us understand the nature of belief. For it is in believing that we risk error. It is natural to think that belief must be a rational response to an environment. After all, we can form our beliefs through inferential steps starting with the evidence we have. What is more, hoping, fearing, intending, and maybe even desiring are responses to the ways things are (or anyway, to the ways we take them to be). Those attitudes are more or less rational reactions to an environment as we find it. But belief cannot be like that. It cannot be, at least not *fundamentally*, a rational response to an independently given environment. Rather, (and this is how I interpret Frege’s suggestion) believing—being right or wrong about how things are—is *having an environment to rationally respond to*. Believing is thus in a different category than such mental states as hoping, fearing, and intending.

Hutchinson, Jim

(Frege and Language, Saturday, 11:45am)

Why Does Frege Talk About Language?

Two apparent tensions arise from Frege's linguistic discussions. First: since his topic is logic and logic is not in any way linguistic, why does he talk about language so much? Second: since language is relevant to logic only because of something in the nature of the specifically human mind, why doesn't his resolution not to discuss anything psychological forbid him to discuss language? I argue that these tensions are best resolved by understanding all Frege's linguistic discussions on the model provided by his discussions of his Begriffsschrift, even though this threatens the broader interest of what he says.

Hylton, Peter

(Varia, Thursday, 9:45am)

The Idea of an Epistemic Condition in Carnap

We can usefully see Carnap’s idea of a linguistic framework as a descendant of the (neo-) Kantian idea of necessary conditions for knowledge (sometimes called an epistemic condition). An epistemic condition makes experience or (ordinary) knowledge possible, and does crucial philosophical work for Kant. It replaces the idea that any of our knowledge is immediate; the world we seek to know is the world as subject to that condition. It gives an account of substantive necessary truths. And it gives a diagnosis of where the metaphysician goes wrong. In spite of its differences from anything in Kant, Carnap’s idea of a linguistic framework plays all of these roles. Carnap, moreover, holds that a precisely specified language is necessary for knowledge.

That idea may seem quite implausible, but it is necessary for the use that Carnap makes of the idea of a linguistic framework. His response to scepticism, for example, relies on the idea that we are speaking a language with definite rules. We appeal to the rules of that language to show that our experience justifies us in making statements about physical objects. The sceptic wants to ask whether there are such objects really, independent of the language; Carnap’s response is

that there is no sense to this question because without some such language there is no knowledge at all. But this Carnapian response is undercut if we have a body of knowledge prior to and independent of the choice of a precisely specified language; in that case, the traditional epistemological questions about the justification of our claims arise for that body of knowledge.

A further point is that if we have knowledge prior to, and independent of, our choice of a language with definite rules, then that choice is presumably constrained by the need to improve the knowledge that we have—and so not made with complete freedom, contrary to the Principle of Tolerance. This is a Quinean rather than a Carnapian position. Unsurprisingly, it goes with Quine's view that attempts at science do not require a precisely specified language. Even an observation categorical, he says, is "a miniature scientific theory" (FSS, p. 26). Nothing like Carnap's view that a precisely specified language is a necessary condition of knowledge is in place here. This is a very fundamental difference between his view and Carnap's.

Imbert, Claude

(Frege on Functions, Wednesday, 5:15pm)

Frege between function and concepts, or Frege from Jena to Göttingen and back

After recalling some paradoxical aspects affecting Frege's reception, my paper will follow three steps:

1) Frege at the school of Gauss: from Jena to Göttingen, where he had been sent by Ernst Abbe, and back

2) *Begriffsschrift* (1879) and its late comments: focusing on *Concept and Function* (1892).

We also note Frege's apology of Kant, to which he dedicated the last paragraphs of *Grundlagen* (1884)

3) After Russels's antinomy, we focus on the last of Frege's *Logische Untersuchungen* and his renunciation to any kind of *Begriffsschrift*. It was to the end of any programme of philosophical galileism of which the second version of *Begriffsschrift* as used in the *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* had been the last and explicitly antinomic result.

So Frege's heritage may be qualified as a partition of the waters according to some decisive syntactical difference between languages. It prepared our to day opposition between the whole family of phenomenological idioms with their implemented scientific or fictional literature, and the family of languages which cannot be spoken, deprived of shifters, including our to day calculi and programing languages.

We conclude on the evidence of their nonetheless unavoidable overlappings which may count as an anthropological injunction and its associated philosophical responsibility.

Ito, Ryo

(Tractatus, Saturday, 11am)

The Notion of Logical Coordinates in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's notion of logical coordinates offers a solution to a problem with the account of truth in terms of existence. It seems as though Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* explains the truth of an atomic sentence in terms of the existence of a corresponding atomic fact. This account, however, makes it difficult to explain how we can establish the absence of an atomic fact and thereby the falsity of an atomic sentence. I argue that Wittgenstein's notion of logical coordinates resolves this difficulty.

Johnston, Colin

(*Tractatus* and Logic, Saturday, 9am)

'Tonk' and Wittgenstein's Tractatus

Logical inferentialism is held to face a challenge, made evident by Prior's 'tonk' example, of explaining when a combination of inferential rules constitutes the meaning of a logical constant. Such a challenge only arises, however, in the context of a reductionism about propositional meaning. The Tractarian Wittgenstein is an inferentialist. But Wittgenstein rejects reductionism about propositional meaning and so Prior's example takes no grip.

Johnstone, Alexander

(Frege on Truth and Judgement, Friday, 9am)

Frege on judgement and the "fundamental logical relation"

Frege has a universalist conception of logic as the maximally general science. But he also claims that what logic is "really concerned" with is the very nature of judgement. These two characterizations seem to stand in tension with one another. Although the difficulty has been made precise in various ways (Ricketts 1985, Conant 1991), I believe it has not yet been understood properly. This is because the second strand is notoriously elusive. My aim is to make some progress on that front, by attending to the significance of Frege's claim that logic is centrally concerned with subsumption and subordination.

Kim, Junyeol

(Frege on Truth and Judgement, Thursday, 11am)

The Abductivist Interpretation of Frege's Conception of Logic

Frege is an abductivist about logic. For him, an acceptable logic must be sufficient—that is, it must be able to explain the relevant data, such as the fact that arithmetical laws are logical truths. Thus, Frege's logicism is an abductive project aimed at establishing the acceptability of his logic, Begriffsschrift. Though he regards logical truths as analytic and a priori, the way he defines analyticity and apriority is fully compatible with abductive selection of a logic. Frege does admit logical intuition, and takes it to play a role in logical investigation, such as in evidence-gathering. However, given that other abductivists also partially recognize such traditional epistemologies for logic, we can legitimately consider Frege an abductivist.

Kosecki, Artur

CANCELLED

Kouri Kissel, Teresa

(Concepts, Thursday, 11am)

Directional Analysis and Conceptual Engineering

Directional analysis, a system originally made precise by Susan Stebbing, was proposed to help us think more clearly about the things we take to be true. Conceptual engineering, arguably originally developed by Rudolf Carnap, is proposed to help us be more accurate in our use of concepts. Both systems of analysis are powerful in their own right, but a comparison of them will help us see that there are two distinct options: either directional analysis just is a type of conceptual engineering, or it serves as a motivational method which can something call for conceptual engineering.

Kremer, Michael

(Interpretations of Frege, Thursday, 9am)

Has the Begriffsschrift theory of Identity been Vindicated? A Fregean Response to Pardey and Wehmeier

In *Begriffsschrift*, Frege proposed that in identity contexts, signs stand not for their (usual) content, but for themselves. Most interpreters have taken Frege to have rejected this “metalinguistic” account of identity in “On Sense and Reference.” Many have also held that the metalinguistic account involved use-mention confusions undercutting the early Frege’s ability to make sense of quantification into identity contexts within his formal theory. Recently, Ulrich Pardey and Kai Wehmeier have argued that these criticisms are mistaken. They claim to show Frege’s position in *Begriffsschrift* to be formally coherent by developing a suitable variant on the standard model theory of first-order logic, and they accuse the critics of the *Begriffsschrift* of anachronism, in imposing Tarskian ideas on Frege, especially the distinction between bound and free variables and the related account of the truth of quantified sentences in terms of satisfaction, and Tarski’s form of the use-mention distinction. I will argue, however, that it is Pardey and Wehmeier who are guilty of anachronism in using post-Tarski model theory to defend the *Begriffsschrift* view of identity. In so doing, they neglect the development of Frege’s thought, not only about identity, but also about quantification, after *Begriffsschrift*. This development goes hand in hand with Frege’s emphasis on carefully distinguishing use and mention. Pardey and Wehmeier also apply lessons from “On Sense and Reference” to formal languages such as Frege introduces; but in so doing they neglect Frege’s own insistence that ordinary language suffers from defects of ambiguity which should not be present in a language suited to precise scientific use. Once this is all understood, it becomes clear that the post-*Begriffsschrift* Frege would have been unable to accept Pardey and Wehmeier’s aid in defending his *Begriffsschrift* view.

Lawrence, Richard

(Basic Law V and Logical Objects, Friday, 11am)

Logical objects: Frege, Grassmann and the idealism of Law V

I wish to explore the following hypothesis: the principles that have recently been called "abstraction principles", including Frege's Basic Law V, should be seen as expressions of a certain intellectual move that was discussed by German idealists known to be Frege's intellectual forebears. Among them is Friedrich Schleiermacher, whose influence on Frege goes through his student Hermann Grassmann. According to this hypothesis, Frege's conviction that Basic Law V is a fundamental law of logic, and that abstraction principles like it can give us a grasp on 'logical objects', stem from the dialectical tradition in logic and should be read in its light.

Linsky, Bernie

(Ramsey, Thursday, 5:15pm)

Ramsey on the Foundations of Mathematics

This talk will present a case for reading Ramsey's essay as an important step in the evolution of Logicism, rather than its end. Examining carefully the review by Alonzo Church in 1931, we find a better account. A first discovery is that three commonplace objections to *Principia Mathematica*, that the axioms of infinity and choice are not logical principles, and that the axiom of reducibility is an *ad hoc* addition to the theory of types, did not originate with Ramsey's essay.

Ramsey's new simple theory of types was in fact a way-station towards the ultimate triumph of axiomatic set theory as the formal basis of the investigations of the foundations of mathematics. Ramsey's positive account of mathematics" is clear: mathematics consists of tautologies. Ramsey begins his proposal to adopt the *simple theory of types* by asserting that the paradoxes listed in *Principia Mathematica* "fall into two fundamentally distinct groups", the logical or mathematical contradictions and those that contain "reference to thought, language, or symbolism, which are not formal but empirical terms."

The simple theory of types, when revised somewhat to become the "cumulative hierarchy" of extensions, is an intuition that underlies Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. George Boolos made this point clear to philosophers, in his (1971), providing an alternative to Quine's vision that axiomatic set theory was an *ad hoc* collection in a subject where "intuition is bankrupt". This is Frank Ramsey's most significant philosophical contribution to the contemporary study of set theory and the foundations of mathematics. The second of Ramsey's contributions to logicism may be perhaps primarily of interest to historians of logic. This is the role that Ramsey had in inspiring Alonzo Church's "realist" interpretation of propositions and propositional functions as seen in Church's "Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with That of Tarski" (1976).

Lovece, Ottavio

(Varia, Wednesday, 3:45pm)

Psychologism and Phenomenalism in J.S. Mill

This paper aims to analyze the characteristics of John Stuart Mill's psychologistic logic in light of Frege's critique. In particular, it seeks to show how the psychologistic nature of Mill's empirical foundation of the principles of logic, arithmetic, and geometry is directly connected to the phenomenalist framework he inherits from the history of British philosophy.

Furthermore, the paper intends to demonstrate that Frege's critical position—especially his distinction between the objective and the actual—provides a privileged standpoint for elucidating the connection between psychologism and phenomenalism.

May, Robert, and Rachel Boddy (Basic Law V and Logical Objects, Friday, 11:45am)

Value-ranges

“The introduction of value-ranges of functions is an essential step forward”, Frege says in describing the innovations introduced in the logical system presented in *Grundgesetze*: “The introduction of the notation for value-ranges seems to me one of the most consequential additions to my concept-script that I made since my first publication in this subject matter.” Frege is forthcoming about the source of this superlative speech: “Value ranges, however, have a much more fundamental importance; for I define cardinal numbers themselves as extensions of concepts, and extensions of concepts are value-ranges, according to my specifications.” The focus of this talk is on this fundamental importance that Frege places on value-ranges for definitions: What are value-ranges such that they can play this role? To do so, in the logical system of *Grundgesetze*, Frege characterizes value-ranges as objectual correlates that represent concepts. However, in setting the identity condition for value-ranges, Frege treats them differently, in terms of the classes they characterize. But, value-ranges cannot consistently represent concepts, not if they are to be identified as what equi-extensional concepts have in common; cf. Russell's Paradox. In this talk, we explore this tension in Frege's thinking about value-ranges between intensional and extensional characterizations, and how this undermines what Frege saw as fundamental about value-ranges, their role in defining the concept of number.

Mestre, José Manuel (Interpretations of Frege, Thursday, 9:45am)

Dummett's Frege is not Russell

James Levine has argued that the distinction between analysis and decomposition that Dummett attributed to Frege should be attributed, not to Frege, but to Russell. In this paper, I draw attention to a more fundamental contrast between Russell and Dummett's Frege that Levine's fruitful discussion nevertheless tends to obscure. I will argue that even if Russell distinguished Dummettian analysis from decomposition, as Levine claimed, he did not regard the analysis of a proposition to consist in its Dummettian analysis.

Miguens, Sofia

CANCELLED

Minar, Edward (Varia, Thursday, 5:15pm)

Rush Rhees on Private Language

Rush Rhees's reply to A.J. Ayer in their symposium on "Can There be a Private Language?" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume XXVIII (1954), pp. 77-94; reprinted in George Pitcher, ed., *Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations* (Notre Dame, 1968), pp. 267-285, and in Rhees, *Discussions of Wittgenstein* (Thoemmes Press, 1970) pp. 55-70) has been largely ignored if not neglected. Ayer had presented a fairly straightforward understanding of Wittgenstein's private language argument and what might be called a "standard" criticism of it. Rhees's response is oblique and may strike the reader as question-begging or dogmatic in its insistence on publicity: "Language is what is spoken." (*Discussions*, p. 70) This impression is too quick, and, especially in the light of the publication of Rhees's investigations into language and meaning in *Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse* (Blackwell, 2006), his reading of the private language considerations merits further attention. Rhees challenges not only the details of Ayer's interpretation and criticism, but also Ayer's sense of where the problems lie and of how Wittgenstein means to approach them. In doing so, Rhees deepens our sense of how Wittgenstein's treatment of private sensation language relates to his broader considerations about rule-following and meaning; most interestingly, he suggests an understanding of Wittgenstein's notion of agreement in judgment that shows how far this critical idea is from anything recognizable as a community-based theory of meaning.

Naibo, Alberto

(Frege on Truth and Judgement, Friday, 9:45am)

Judgemental and Definitional Equality from a Fregean Perspective

The notions of definitional and judgmental equality play a central role in constructive type theory. However, their relationship is not always clearly defined: sometimes the two notions are identified, while other times they are treated as distinct. This divergence can already be seen in the work of Martin-Löf, who identified the two notions in his discussion of the intensional version of constructive type theory in the mid-1970s, but treated them as distinct in his mid-1980s monograph, where constructive type theory is presented in its extensional version. Nevertheless, in both cases, Martin-Löf referred to some of Frege's positions on identity to support his views. In this presentation, I will attempt to explain the reasons behind these different views about the relationship between definitional and judgmental equality by reading constructive type theory in the light of Frege's distinctions between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*), and between function and object, as well as by considering Frege's account of the notion of equality of content (*Inhaltsgleichheit*).

Nir, Gilad

(Wittgenstein, Wednesday, 4:30pm)

Wittgenstein, the Limits of Thought, and Transcendental Idealism

This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over the question whether Wittgenstein pursues some form of transcendental idealism. I aim to shed new light on this question by looking at the 1931 manuscript in which Wittgenstein suggests that his reflections on the limits of language embody "the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy". I argue that what Wittgenstein takes from Kant is not transcendental idealism but the idea that philosophical problems are not to be solved, but to be dissolved, namely by drawing limits to the domain in which certain forms of question can be legitimately raised.

Nitzschke, Vincenz

(Wittgenstein and others, Saturday, 3:45pm)

How Wittgenstein adopted Hertz's Method

Hertz's influence on Wittgenstein is widely recognized - first of all by Wittgenstein himself in 1931. However, his *Principles of Mechanics* are mostly seen as a vague inspiration rather than a clear guide to the clarification of logically obscure concepts. I will object to this interpretation and present an example from his middle period where Wittgenstein untangles a "conceptual mess" by using a technique quite similar to the method Hertz used. He takes up an important hint from Hertz, which he later uses to further develop his way of doing philosophy.

Nunez, Tyke

(Symposium *Early Russell on Geometry*, Friday, 9am)

Russell's Early Hylomorphism: Sigwart's Collective Concepts and Space in Foundations of Geometry

In his 1897 *Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*, Bertrand Russell rethinks Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions. In this talk I aim to present how. The locus of Russell's reconceptualization is our original representation of space. In *Foundations*, Russell rejects both Kant's view that our original representation of space is an a priori intuition and the one that Kant takes Leibniz to hold on which space is originally a general concept. Instead, Russell argues that our original representation of space has the structure of Sigwart's collective concepts, which share features of Kantian concepts and intuitions. I examine this argument and its ramifications, especially for the hylomorphism that Russell endorses in *Foundations*.

Oliva, Luca

(Frege in Comparison, Thursday, 9:45am)

Mathematical Similarities between Frege and Rickert

Contrary to the conventional assessment of the neo-Kantian School of Baden (Beiser 2014, Heis 2018, Staiti 2018), Rickert's philosophy of mathematics shows signs of Fregean influence. This paper compares Frege's *Grundlagen* (1884) with Rickert's *Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins* (1924) to establish this influence and evaluate its significance. The focus is on four central arguments: (a) the analysis of two distinct ways of logically founding whole numbers, which are based on equinumerosity (Potter 2020, Zalta 2020) and the subject-predicate relation (Oliva 2022), respectively; (b) the identification of whole numbers with mind-independent objects; (c) the similarity between Frege's notion of a *third realm* (Borges 1992, Reck 2005, Ricketts 1986) and Rickert's notion of *validity* (Glock 2015, Lotze 1874; Windelband 1910); and (d) the critique of abstractionism as defended by Mill (Mill 1843) and Husserl (Husserl 1891, Sokolowski 1970, Tieszen 1989), which both Frege and Rickert share.

Özaltun, Eylem

(Anscombe, Friday, 3:45pm)

The Reductio of "The First Person"

Anscombe's "The First Person"¹ (1975) is a notoriously difficult paper. One difficulty stems from the blatant implausibility of its main thesis: that the role of the first-person pronoun is *not* to make reference. The other difficulty is due to the complexity of its argumentative structure. I believe that once we understand the paper's structure and grasp the reasons put forward, the referring view of "I" will not strike us as obvious. To this end, I will focus on one part of the paper: the so-called *reductio* against the referring view of "I" and show that whatever Anscombe's *reductio* might be, it is not what the commentators take it to be. I will provide a new interpretation of the *reductio* by registering the specific interlocutor it is addressed to and the role it is meant to play in the overall structure of the paper. The *reductio* of "The First Person" is often taken to be an anti-cartesian argument in the literature. I will show that not only that it is not an anti-cartesian argument, but it is also Anscombe's way of putting a Cartesian insight, which is central to TFP and has occupied her since the 1940s, in use against the *other* interlocutor of TFP: the insensitive logician.

Panza, Marco

(Frege, Thursday, 3:45pm)

The other Frege

The title of the talk is also that of a book I'm writing with Andrea Sereni under contract with OUP. The talk will shortly present some arguments developed in the book. It will, in particular, question some usually accepted views about Frege, which have crucially contributed to making him be considered as a father of analytical philosophy. Here are some of them:

1. Frege's foundational program for mathematics (or, more precisely, arithmetic and real analysis) is a philosophical (or even metaphysical) program. It will instead be argued that this is a typical mathematical program aiming at promoting an appropriate (to Frege's views) architectonic of mathematics.
2. This program was based on a platonist conception of objects and concepts (and relations). It will instead be argued that Frege's platonism for objects is quite peculiar and far from classical (ontological) platonism, and that Frege was in no way a platonist of concepts (and relations).
3. This program was essentially logicist in nature. It will instead be argued that Frege's envisaged definitions of natural and real numbers mainly aim at showing that our epistemic access to these numbers (as explicitly defined objects) does not depend on intuition, and that the logical nature of these definitions was viewed as a welcome, but in no way essential, outcome (and that they are not, by far, the most convenient ones that Frege might have provided if his aim had been that of reducing arithmetic and real analysis to logic).
4. This program aligns (on a philosophical versant) with the general program of arithmetization of analysis. It will instead be argued that Frege's views about the role and nature of functions were in crucial and manifest contrast with those that the arithmetization of analysis depended on and promoted.
5. The inconsistency of Frege's Basic Law V, in the presence of full comprehension, makes his definition of both natural and real numbers unescapably inconsistent. It will instead be argued that, by restricting his rule of substitution equivalent to full comprehension, Frege might have provided a (much more plausibly logical and) consistent definition of natural numbers

(incompatible with Hume's principle) and made his definition of real numbers (only locally and inessentially modified) perfectly consistent (and not only independent of the definition of natural numbers, but also apt to provide a basis for a manifestly non-logical definition of these last numbers).

Powell, Michael

(Varia, Saturday, 11:45am)

Observational Self-Ascription and Error through Misidentification

Wittgenstein's *Blue Book* remarks on the uses 'as object' and 'as subject' of 'I' (and 'my') have given rise to much discussion of 'identification-dependence' and 'error through misidentification'. These discussions largely center on debates about whether self-ascriptions belonging to this or that sub-class are identification-dependent or identification-free (and accordingly either liable or immune to error through misidentification). In this paper, I consider a class of self-ascriptions which has so far avoided controversy: observation-based self-ascriptions. It is widely held that observational self-ascriptions are, across the board, identification-dependent and so liable to error through misidentification. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. I do so by distinguishing between *direct* and *indirect* observational self-ascriptions, and arguing that the former are typically, and paradigmatically, identification-free. In the course of my discussion there emerges a new way of thinking about Wittgenstein's accident case--in which one thinks 'my arm is broken' and is mistaken because it isn't one's own arm one sees to be broken--and the kind of error on display there.

Rappuoli, Luca Alberto

(Russell, Saturday, 4:30pm)

Russell's Meta-philosophy: Moorean Relics and Unfounded Expectations

Russell's philosophical views have notoriously undergone frequent, as much as radical, changes. Amidst these changes, however, two influential meta-philosophical commitments remain constant: the first is the idea that the goal of philosophical enquiry is to tell us something about the *make-up of reality*, not just about the make-up of our representations thereof; the second, that the appropriate method for pursuing this goal is that of *analysis*. I will argue that there is a fundamental tension between these two meta-philosophical commitments – a disconnect, so to speak, between what the method of analysis *aims* to achieve, and what it *can* legitimately achieve.

Rattan, Gurpreet, and Marion Durand

(Varia, Thursday, 4:30pm)

The Cognitive Significance of Higher-Order Senses

Fregean senses and Thoughts, understood as the constituents of the contents of thinkers' propositional attitudes, like belief, are individuated by their cognitive significance. Much has been written about how to understand the cognitive significance of senses. Frege and

commentators following him have also proposed the *sense hierarchy* in which customary senses stand as the lowest order of a potentially infinite hierarchy of senses. Although the sense hierarchy has been a topic of some discussion in the literature, almost nothing has been written about the cognitive significance of higher-order senses. This paper addresses this significant lacuna in the literature on the nature of sense. Three main topics are addressed: (1) the relevance of Mates's Puzzle for the hierarchy, which is taken to be instructive but incapable of providing a full account of the cognitive significance of higher-senses; a formulation of a Criterion of Difference for Customary Senses, which is then generalised into a Generalised Criterion of Difference for Senses, for senses of any order of the hierarchy; and a specification of the kind of rational situation, which we call intersubjective interpretive conflict, in which the Generalized Criterion serves to distinguish senses, of any order.

Rechter, Ofra

(Syposium Early Russell on Geometry, Friday, 9:45am)

A Kantian Variation on a Russellian Theme

-abstract-

Reck, Erich

(Wittgenstein, Friday, 9:45am)

CANCELLED

Ricketts, Tom

(Varia, Thursday, 4:30pm)

CANCELLED

Rieppel, Michael

(Varia, Thursday, 5:15pm)

In Search of Essentially Predicative Entities

According to a Fregean view, predicates cannot denote objects, construed as any kind of thing a name could denote. This paper critically examines linguistically oriented arguments that attempt to establish the Fregean conclusion by reflection on how names and predicates combine to form truth-apt sentences. I begin with two such arguments but conclude that they remain unconvincing. I then reconstruct a third argument, inspired by Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning, and argue that shows that something in a sentence must indeed have a semantic function other than that of denoting an object. However, the Fregean victory remains constrained, in that we have little reason to think English predicates must be what play that non-denoting role, especially if predicate position is to be open to quantification.

Rivello, Edoardo

(History of Logic, Friday, 11:45am)

An account of implicit definitions based on Gergonne-Frege's algebraic metaphor

Both Gergonne (1818-1819, *Essai sur la théorie des définitions*) and Frege (1903, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik II*, §66) – independently? – use an algebraic metaphor to illustrate *implicit definitions* by means of comparison with systems of equations. In my talk I will formulate logical criteria for implicit definition by formalizing Gergonne-Frege's metaphorical speech. These criteria will be contrasted with the textbook notions of implicit and explicit definability involved in the statement and proof of Beth's definability theorem. Alongside, I will also explore a possible weakening of the uniqueness of solution requirement parenthetically suggested by Dummett (1981, *Frege. Philosophy of Language*, 2nd ed.).

Rossberg, Marcus

(Frege and others, Saturday, 5:15pm)

Two Notes on Frege and the Stoics

For a long time, we have been wondering about the remarkable similarities between Frege's logic and some Stoic logical doctrines. Since there seems to have been little uptake of the Stoics' ideas after their heyday, we were left to wonder whether some of these ideas have just been hanging around in the air, as it were, for centuries until Frege revived them or whether these similarities were pure coincidence: perhaps just different thinkers hitting on the truth independently? Thanks to Susanne Bobzien's impressive work on the matter, we now know the answer. Frege more or less directly took on Stoic ideas, mediated by Carl von Prantl's *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*. The case Bobzien makes is overwhelming. The purpose of my note is to further investigate the matter by adding two supplementary observations to the case: one similarity and one difference between Frege's conception and the Stoics', both pertaining to proper names.

Ruffino, Marco

(Frege on Vagueness and Determinacy, Wednesday, 5:15pm)

Pragmatics as a By-Product of Logic in Frege's Early Writings

In this presentation I shall focus on Frege's early writings and relate them to some aspects of contemporary pragmatics, especially to the notion of implicature, speech acts and presuppositions. First, I shall analyze passages in which Frege filters out grammatical aspects of language. As I intend to show, in fixing the limits of his logic he anticipates a very subtle—even if most of the time negative—characterization of the linguistic phenomenon of conventional implicature that would almost a century later be rediscovered by Grice (1967), although Grice does not seem aware of the Fregean antecedents of the topic. Second, I shall discuss Frege's justification for introducing the assertion sign (BS §2) and the definition sign (BS §24) as logical symbols. As some scholars have pointed out, Frege not only recognizes distinct illocutionary forces in logical assertions and definitions but also wants to include a marker for those forces in the object-language of logic (indeed, as logical signs), going against a tradition before (and after) him of indicating illocutionary force only in the metalanguage. Finally, I shall make some remarks concerning Frege's notion of presupposition (*Voraussetzung*) in the *Begriffsschrift* and related articles. As it will become clear, what he has in mind at this stage of his thought is something quite different from the notion later presented

in “*Über Sinn und Bedeutung*” and that became the center of attention of contemporary pragmatics (e.g., in Strawson (1950), Karttunen (1973) and Levinson (1983)).

Rump, Jacob

(Varia, Thursday, 4:30pm)

Frege, Grasping, and Understanding

I will discuss Frege’s account of grasping a proposition in light of recent work on the epistemology of understanding, which has frequently appealed to the metaphor of grasping. In this recent work, grasping is often associated with a high-level epistemic achievement—one sometimes even said to rank above knowledge. For Frege, by contrast, grasping is a humbler achievement, since one may grasp a proposition without thereby endorsing it or acknowledging it as true. I explore this difference and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the metaphor for helping us to come to a better appreciation of the relationship between propositions and understanding—a contested issue in contemporary epistemology.

Schiemer, Georg

CANCELLED

Schloeder, Julian

(History of Logic, Friday, 5:15pm)

Arithmetic is Analytic

Frege defined the analytic truths to be all that follows from logical laws and definitions. Since his Basic Law V is inconsistent, it remains open what the analytic truths about extensions are. I argue that if all we are interested in are these analytic truths (as opposed to laws also explaining synthetic reasoning with extensions), we can remain with a much weaker (meta) law: that whenever some claim A in the language without extensions is analytic, then the claim A' is analytic where A' is obtained from A by uniformly replacing "x is P" by "x is in the extension of P" for any x and P. I argue that this meta-law is adequate to Frege's understanding of extensions, and demonstrate that it is sufficient to derive second order Peano Arithmetic.

Schmitz, Cyriak

CANCELLED

Sereni, Andrea

(Varia, Thursday, 9am)

Fregean foundations and Fregean definitions

Definitions of core mathematical concepts, both in Frege and in the Neo-Fregean tradition, are apparently required to perform a wide bundle of different duties. They have a semantic import in providing meaning (either sense, or reference, or both) to mathematical expressions. They have an ontological import in supporting existential proofs for specific kinds of mathematical objects. They have an epistemic import in sustaining a priori knowledge of mathematical statements. They have an explanatory import in providing an explanation or analysis of pre-theoretically available mathematical concepts. They have a metaphysical import in establishing an order of dependence among non-mathematical truths and mathematical truths, and among mathematical truths themselves. And they have a mathematical import, not only in providing mathematical rigor through a suitably formalized logical system, but also in supporting a specific architectonics of mathematical theories. Whether any of these different roles should be given priority over the others, may depend on the underlying conception of (Fregean or Neo-Fregean) foundations being adopted. On the other hand, it's not clear that one univocal conception of mathematical definition can actually meet all these requirements at once. We discuss the coherence and tenability of this set of different desiderata, also comparing the role of mathematical definitions in conceptual analysis vs. their role in explications.

Shaw, James

(Language in Analytic Philosophy, Friday, 9:45am)

Reflections on Externalism about Linguistic Content

According to a common story, before the work of Putnam and Burge many philosophers were committed to broadly internalist theories of language and thought. Then thought experiments like Twin Earth ushered in a new era dominated by externalism. I raise some questions about whether there is any truth to this story as it pertains exclusively to externalism about linguistic content (and so setting aside mental content). I begin by arguing that Putnam's attributions of internalist commitments to his predecessors (notably Carnap and Frege) seem to be predicated on confusions and inaccuracies. Partially on this basis, I actually express uncertainty about what a substantive thesis of internalism about linguistic content could even amount to. Putnam's own formulations (largely taken up by subsequent philosophers) strike me as trivially false—that is, falsified by much simpler cases than Twin Earth, such as by the speech of young children or learners of new foreign languages. These speech cases are so simple and pervasive it is not clear how any theorist really could have overlooked them to build up theories that would exclude their possibility. I try to shore up a definition of internalism in stages, only coming to one that satisfies me by straying a bit from Putnam's starting point. A virtue of the resulting definition of internalism is that it is not falsified by simple cases, and it certainly could be falsified on certain construals of thought experiments like Twin Earth. The problem is that, given the new formulation, the standard thought experiments only falsify internalism when supplemented by a substantive thesis about our cognitive relations to language that neither Putnam nor any of his successors really defended. I conclude that Twin Earth effectively motivates a disjunction between two forms of linguistic content externalism, one broadly familiar, one somewhat less so. The choice between the externalist theories really hinges on how we understand a very specific, technical cognitive relation that we bear to word meanings. Ironically, the two philosophers Putnam explicitly criticized for their internalism—Carnap and Frege—can be interpreted as taking the first steps into exploring each of these two externalist theories.

Stanley, Emelia

(Concepts, Thursday, 11:45am)

Formalising Open Texture for Mathematical Concepts

Waismann's notion of open texture has historically been taken to disapply to mathematical concepts. Contrary to this, I present a formalisation of open texture as a species of non-eliminative definition, and argue for its occurrence in actual mathematical contexts. Considering several case studies from the history of mathematics, I conclude that open texture plays a critical role in characterising mathematical epistemology and practice, and offer an account of its purpose.

Stjernberg, Fredrik

(Ramsey, Thursday, 3:45pm)

Frege and Ramsey

The non-interaction between Frege and Ramsey stands out as one of the missed opportunities of twentieth century philosophy. They were at times interested in similar issues, and had many contacts in common, contacts which (rightly) held both in high esteem. Ramsey assigned readings of Frege to his students. That they never met or corresponded, or commented on, each others work is still not very surprising. Frege had more or less retired when Ramsey started working, and Ramsey had enough on his plate during his short career. This paper considers a few areas in which there is a certain overlap between their views, or places where there are fruitful possibilities of comparison. A few areas stand out. First, Ramsey's development of the logicist programme, as it was carried out in his "Foundations of Mathematics" (1926). Second, their views on truth, which show some similarities. Third, their views on the analysis of sentences, and the relations between subject and predicate, where Ramsey's views seem to present a direct challenge to Frege's view of the unsaturatedness of predicate expressions (Sullivan 2010). A tantalizing fourth area is that Ramsey and Frege were among the very first readers of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and among the first to write on it (Ramsey 1923, Frege in private correspondence with Wittgenstein 1914–1920, translated in Dreben & Floyd 2011). In my talk, I will mainly focus on the third issue, their different views on the analysis of sentences.

Trächtler, Jasmin

(Wittgenstein, Friday, 9am)

The Measure of the Ordinary – Wittgenstein and the Possibility for a Liberatory Grammar of Inappropriate/d Others

Wittgenstein often compares words, concepts, language with a *measure* that we apply to things, to the world, to ourselves. Based on an exegesis of his reflections on concept-formation as well as on rules, normativity and normality, I will discuss the question of the 'fit' or rather misfit, between world, language and life from a political point of view: Bringing together Wittgenstein with feminist thinkers, I will concludingly focus on the space between the lines of our conceptual measurement as a space of *inappropriate/d others* and discuss the possibility for a liberatory redescription of the grammar of gender and race concepts.

Travis, Charles

(Varia, Thursday, 5:15pm)

Re-Turning the Linguistic Turn (Two Puzzles)

The 'linguistic turn' in philosophy might be seen as ignited in Vienna early last century, but (with a bit of help from the German response to Versailles) spread like covid throughout the anglosphere, creating a template for discussion of issues (for the most part traditional) arising throughout philosophy, notably 'M&E'. As Frege insists, his problems, and their relatives, are not about language. In his words, "We must never neglect the deep gap which separates the domain of the thinkable from that of the linguistic, and by which the mutual correspondence between these areas is confined in determinate ways." (1915: 1983/279). By treating two puzzles I will try to develop Frege's point and its importance.

Tritschler, Marvin

(Frege & Wittgenstein on Force and Content, Friday, 11:45am)

Force, Content, and the Linguistic Turn in Frege and Wittgenstein

In my talk, I discuss the relation between a proper understanding of the force content distinction and a proper understanding of the linguistic turn in Frege and Wittgenstein. My main thesis is that we are in danger of misunderstanding the apt critique Wittgenstein levels in many forms against the dualistic conception of the force content distinction Frege sometimes suggests if we are not prepared to say more about how all judging depends on the use of linguistic signs for the actualization of the acts required for there to even be content to be asserted.

Uçan, Timur

(Frege on Vagueness and Determinacy, Wednesday, 4:30pm)

Determinacy after Frege

Frege radically contributed to a philosophical account of determinacy by conceiving determinacy as a requirement which concerns concepts (1896). The way Frege proposed involved to oppose determinacy to vagueness. His approach contributed to the achievement of more precise delineations of the expressions of our thoughts. Nevertheless Frege's way also led to difficulties, as testified by his exchanges with Russell (Frege-Russell, 1902-1912; Burgess, 2005; Zalta, 2024): requiring the complete determinacy of concepts involves requiring the complete determinacy of extensions, although that could not turn out coherent.

Then, could determinacy be, as such, to be opposed to vagueness? Determinacy indeed can be opposed to vagueness but could not be equivalent with its only opposite. Another opposite of vagueness is indecisivity (Uçan, 2016, 135). Further, a logical account of vagueness has been elaborated by Williamson (1994). And MacFarlane (2020) also proposed to think vagueness as indecision without presupposing the necessity of the exclusion of vagueness.

These considerations matter to reconsider as much historically as philosophically Frege's achievements and Wittgenstein's philosophical and critical inheritance of these achievements. Indeed, according to an approach which became relatively standard, Frege's opposition of determinacy to vagueness was not problematic. But Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* should be read as involving the exclusion of vagueness (Putnam, 2012, 349; Maddy, 2014, 63). However, these approaches entirely neglect not only that Wittgenstein has envisaged the possibility of thinking vagueness determinately, but also has defended the *justifiability* of vagueness (Wittgenstein, 1915). I accordingly propose a study of the standard conception of the problems posed by

Frege's requirement of determinacy and its radicalization by Wittgenstein. I then propose a resolute reading, eventually therapeutical, eventually liberatory, of Frege's requirement of determinacy and of its radicalization by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*.

Vanrie, Wim

(Metaphors in Analytic Philosophy, Thursday, 11am)

Rivers, not doors: The philosophical significance of Wittgenstein's metaphors in On Certainty

In §96 of *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein introduces his famous river metaphor: "It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid". The metaphor is a deep and complex one, whose philosophical upshot cannot—of course—be understood independently of the rest of the book. In this paper, I seek to draw attention to a dimension of the metaphor that has, as far as I can tell, so far been ignored by scholars. That dimension is the fact that the bank of a river is carved out *by* the flow of the water—the former is an *effect* of the latter. Taken seriously, this suggests that the hardening of certain empirical propositions into hinge-propositions that are constitutive of our world-picture is an *effect* of the fluidity of other empirical propositions. There is thus a peculiar relation of two-way dependence between hinge-propositions that are impervious to doubt, on the one hand, and regular empirical propositions that are open for testing and refutation, on the other hand. My aim is twofold: (1) Show that this two-way dependence is not merely implicit in the river metaphor, but is conceptualized by Wittgenstein throughout *On Certainty*; (2) Show that a proper understanding of this two-way dependence puts into question certain assumptions about the nature of hinges that are prevalent in contemporary readings of *On Certainty*.

Wagner, Pierre

(The Vienna Circle, Friday, 4:30pm)

The Vienna Circle between imagination and the reality. Transmission and overcoming of a representation in France in the second half of the 20th Century

A representation of the Vienna Circle emerged in France in the 1930s, in a context that was hardly conducive to a positive reception. Over the following three decades, the transmission of that representation led to the formation of a distorted image that began to be questioned and was occasionally challenged in the 1970s, then more forcefully in the 1980s, before a rehabilitation movement began in the 1990s. In this talk, I will concentrate on the lesser-known part of this story: the transmission of this representation in the post-war period, up to the rehabilitation movement in the early 1990s.

Wimmer, Simon

(E.E.C. Jones and her influence, Friday, 3:45pm)

Wodehouse on Apprehension

G.F. Stout (1860-1944) argues that apprehension is distinct from attitudes like belief and disbelief, among others. In 1908, for instance, he writes that "in reference to any logical

possibility which our thought apprehends, we may take up certain alternative subjective attitudes, called belief, disbelief, doubt, or mere imagination” (‘Immediacy, Mediacy, and Coherence’) My aim here is to reconstruct a challenge Helen Wodehouse (1880-1964; student then fellow at Girton College, Cambridge from 1898 to 1903) raises for Stout. For Wodehouse, all of Stout’s subjective attitudes are identical to instances of apprehension. I show that there are two key components to Wodehouse’s view. The first is a commitment she shares with one of her teachers at Girton, the logician Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones (1848-1922), namely that there “are various universes of reality” (Wodehouse ‘Judgment and Apprehension’ 1908, 360, cf. Jones’ ‘Mr. Russell’s Objections to Frege’s Analysis of Propositions’, 1910). The second key component is that Wodehouse takes apprehension to have more structure than Stout does: one never merely apprehends something, but always apprehends it as belonging to some universe of reality. According to Wodehouse, “the cognitive process [= apprehension] is precisely the same whatever universe is in question, whether it be one of those roughly classed as “actual,” or whether it be one of those roughly classed as “imaginary”” (1908, 360). Whereas Stout holds that to believe, for instance, is to treat an independently apprehended logical possibility as actualised, Wodehouse claims that to believe is just to apprehend a logical possibility as belonging to the actual universe. After outlining Wodehouse’s account of belief, I explain how she accounts for Stout’s remaining subjective attitudes and the data Stout cites in favour of his view. I conclude by highlighting that Wodehouse’s view is a viable, but unjustly ignored and forgotten, alternative to the views of her contemporaries.

Wiseman, Rachael

(Anscombe, Friday, 4:30pm)

‘My past depends on choice & pattern’: Murdoch and Anscombe on ‘the reality of the past’

One way to read Anscombe’s philosophy of action (e.g. in her 1956) is as an attack on a dominant picture of the spatio-temporal character of human action. According to that picture, actions are – or are composed of – events that have no, or very little, temporal duration, and are spatial-ly located at, or in, the body of the agent whose actions they are. In contrast to this picture, Anscombe urges that what we treat as ‘before’, ‘now’, and ‘afterwards’ – the temporal span of the present – is indexed to the realm of practical reason. This thought requires a view about the relation between the past and present that can accommodate the idea that placing an action ‘in the past’ – as something that happened rather than is happening – can be something other than simply locating an event in chronological time. In her first and brilliant publication ‘The Reality of the Past’ (1948?/1981), Anscombe provides just that. Anscombe’s framework makes sense of two ideas that might otherwise seem incoherent. First, there are descriptions of what I was doing at time t_1 that come to be true only later, at t_2 , when the practical ‘now’ of my action is over. Second, and because of this, what I do at t_2 can affect what it was I did in the past, at t_1 , so long as both t_1 and t_2 are within the span of a unifying practical ‘now’. In this paper I explain this set of ideas and outline some methodological implications for the activity of philosophy and the history of philosophy.

Yi, Byeong-uk

(Varia, Saturday, 9am)

McTaggart on the Reality of Time

McTaggart (1908; 1921) argues against the existence and reality of time, and holds that “all statements which involve its [i.e., time’s] reality are erroneous”. While he belongs to the British idealist tradition, which precedes the British analytic movement lead by G. E. Moore and B. Russell, his argument is presented in a style associated with analytic philosophy. And the argument involves elements of tense logic, and “one could say that there is tense-logic itself in McTaggart, though Findlay was the first to see it as such” Prior (1970b, 13). In this talk, I will examine McTaggart’s argument in light of the shaping of modern tense logic by Findlay (1941) and Prior (1970a; 1970b).

Zach, Richard

(History of Logic, Friday, 3:45pm)

Analytic philosophers and the automation on reasoning

The dream of making machines reason is as old as at least Leibniz. Work in artificial intelligence started in the 1950s with the almost simultaneous invention and implementation of proof search algorithms that are still used today. These algorithms were based on the work of logicians working on Hilbert's program, especially Bernays, Herbrand, and Gentzen. Strikingly, most of the theoretical groundwork and early practical work was done by analytic philosophers. The talk will focus on the work preceding and influencing Alan Robinson's resolution proof system, found in the work of W. V. O. Quine, Burton Dreben, Martin Davis & Hilary Putnam, and Bernard Symonds & Roderick Chisholm.

Zapero, David

(Anscombe, Friday, 5:15pm)

The Appeal to Grammar

Perceptual verbs are generally used to speak of a certain achievement. For someone to hear, see, etc. is for them to be sensitive, in a certain way, to their surroundings. In her ‘Intentionality of Sensation’, Anscombe denies that perceptual verbs (on their perceptual use) invariably serve to speak of such an achievement. We will consider her reasons for that denial and how they connect to other issues concerning mental life.